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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 15-3394 
______________ 
 
ROBERT WELLMAN, JR., 
    Appellant 
   
v. 
 
BUTLER AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
DR. JOHN WYLLIE, Individually, and in his  
capacity as principal of the Butler Area High School 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-13-cv-00616) 
District Judge: Hon. Mark R. Hornak 
______________ 
 
Argued: November 7, 2017  
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: December 12, 2017) 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Robert Wellman, Jr., appeals the District Court’s order 
dismissing his complaint without prejudice for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction because he failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.  He 
contends that the Court erred because none of his claims seek 
relief under the IDEA and, in any event, exhaustion would be 
futile.   
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 The outcome of this appeal is largely dictated by the 
Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Fry v. Napoleon 
Community Schools, 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017), which requires 
that we consider the “crux”—the “gravamen”—of the 
complaint to determine whether a plaintiff seeks relief for 
“denial of the IDEA’s core guarantee [of] . . . a free and 
appropriate education [FAPE,]” id. at 748 (quotation marks 
omitted); if so, then the plaintiff must exhaust his 
administrative remedies under the IDEA.  Because the 
gravamen of each count in Wellman’s complaint seeks relief 
for the denial of a FAPE, Wellman would typically be required 
to exhaust his claims.  Wellman concedes, however, that he 
released all claims seeking relief based on the denial of a 
FAPE, and thus, he has no claims to exhaust.  As a result, we 
will vacate the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint 
without prejudice and remand with instructions to dismiss the 
complaint with prejudice.   
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I1 
 
 Wellman attended high school in the Butler Area 
School District (“the School District”).  He suffered a head 
injury while playing flag football in his freshman physical 
education class.  After school that day, Wellman attended 
football practice, where he suffered additional head injuries.  
The following day, Wellman saw his doctor and later 
underwent a CT scan, which revealed that he had sustained a 
concussion.  Wellman suffered “pain” and experienced 
“staring spells, trouble sleeping, and difficulty concentrating.”  
App. 126.   
 
 Wellman returned to school, but his mother asked the 
school to assist him until his concussion healed.  Wellman’s 
mother requested that Wellman be taken out of his German and 
physical education classes, that he be given extra study halls, 
and that the football coach not allow him to engage in any 
unsuitable physical activity.  Rather than allow him to rest 
during his extra study halls, however, the teachers required him 
to take make-up exams.  Wellman alleges that the school’s 
indifference to his need for accommodations increased his 
stress and aggravated his cognitive problems.   
   
                                              
 1 The facts are taken from the Second Amended 
Complaint.  Because this appeal involves a facial challenge to 
the existence of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), we accept as true the facts alleged 
in the complaint and construe them in favor of the nonmoving 
party.  Constitution Party of Pa. v. Acihele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 
n.12 (3d Cir. 2014).   
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 After performing an EEG test, Wellman’s doctor wrote 
a letter asking the school to provide Wellman with academic 
accommodations, specifically tutors and more time to 
complete his assignments.  The school ignored these requests.    
   
 A few weeks later, Wellman attended a high school 
football game.  Before the game, Wellman’s mother told the 
football coach that Wellman had a concussion, was not cleared 
to participate in the game, and should not be exposed to any 
possibility of physical contact.  Despite this conversation, the 
football coach asked Wellman to hold one of the markers on 
the sidelines.  Wellman was not wearing any protective gear.  
During the game, a player in full uniform ran into Wellman and 
knocked him over, causing another head injury.    
 
 After this incident, Wellman’s concussion symptoms 
worsened, and he experienced severe headaches, problems 
focusing, and exhaustion.  A CT scan revealed that he had post-
concussive syndrome.  Wellman began to miss school because 
of his symptoms and medical appointments, and when he was 
able to attend school, his teachers refused to provide 
accommodations for him.  As a result, Wellman suffered 
significant stress, embarrassment, and anxiety.   
 
 Wellman and his mother met with the principal 
regarding his teachers’ failure to accommodate him,2 but the 
principal was dismissive of his problems.  Because the School 
District would not accommodate him, Wellman requested and 
received homebound instruction but claimed that the teachers 
                                              
2 The Complaint states that Wellman’s teachers ignored 
his doctor’s request for accommodations and were “giving 
Wellman too much work.”  App. 131.     
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who provided the instruction were generally apathetic.  
Wellman attempted to return to school, but again his teachers 
denied his requests for accommodations,3 and he quickly 
returned to homebound instruction for the remainder of the 
2009-10 academic year.  
 
 Wellman attempted to return to school for the 2010-11 
academic year but was overwhelmed by severe anxiety.  To 
reduce his anxiety, Wellman and his mother asked that he be 
allowed to switch his lunch period so that he could eat lunch 
with his friends, but the request was denied.  Wellman had 
panic attacks at the thought of returning to school, and he 
returned to homebound instruction.     
 
 In October 2010, Wellman’s mother requested that he 
be evaluated for an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”).4  
The school determined that Wellman was not eligible for an 
IEP.  However, Wellman underwent an independent 
evaluation, which concluded that he met the criteria for anxiety 
                                              
3 It is not clear from the complaint which 
accommodations were requested and denied during this time 
period.   
 4 The state administers a FAPE by developing an IEP 
for every child with disabilities.  20 U.S.C. § 1414(d).  Once a 
child is identified as having special needs, “[a] school district 
provides a FAPE by designing and implementing an 
individualized instructional program set forth in an [IEP], 
which must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to 
receive meaningful educational benefits in light of the 
student’s intellectual potential.”  G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. 
Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 607 (3d Cir. 2015) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
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disorder and cognitive disorder due to a medical condition.  
Thereafter, Wellman’s mother, his therapists, and school 
officials met.  The school proposed a “Chapter 15/504 plan”5 
to help Wellman return to school, but the parties could not 
reach an agreement on its implementation.  App. 134.  Four 
months later, they met again to discuss a Chapter 15/504 plan, 
but school officials appeared uninterested in giving Wellman 
“any sort of accommodations.”  Id.  Wellman finished his 
sophomore year in cyber school.  The following year, he 
enrolled in private school, from which he eventually graduated.   
  
 Wellman and his parents filed a due process complaint 
with the Pennsylvania Department of Education against the 
School District, requesting a hearing, an IEP, compensatory 
                                              
 5 Chapter 15 of the Pennsylvania Code implements the 
statutory and regulatory requirements of § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, 22 Pa. Code § 15.1(a).  
Section 504 requires schools to provide “a free appropriate 
public education,” defined in the Rehabilitation Act as “the 
provision of regular or special education and related aids and 
services that (i) are designed to meet individual educational 
needs of [students with disabilities] as adequately as the needs 
of [nondisabled students] are met and (ii) are based upon 
adherence to procedures that satisfy the requirements of § 
104.34 [least restrictive setting], § 104.35 [evaluation and 
placement], and § 104.36 [procedural safeguards].”  34 C.F.R. 
§ 104.33(b)(1).  “Section 504 defines disability more broadly 
than the IDEA, and thus, some students covered by Section 504 
are not covered under the IDEA.”  Batchelor v. Rose Tree 
Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 269 n.4 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(citations omitted). 
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education for two years, and payment of Wellman’s private 
school tuition.  Wellman and the School District eventually 
entered into a Settlement and Release Agreement (“the 
Settlement Agreement”) with respect to the claims in the due 
process case.  Under the Settlement Agreement, the Wellmans 
released the School District and its employees  
 
from all rights, claims, causes of action, and 
damages of any nature including, but not limited 
to, any claim for legal fees and/or costs, which 
were pursued in the above-referenced case or 
which could have been pursued in the above-
referenced case, pursuant to the [IDEA], as 
amended; the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA); or any other Federal or State statute, 
including the regulations promulgated 
thereunder. 
 
App. 101.     
 
 Wellman thereafter filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against 
the School District and the high school’s principal.  In the 
operative complaint, Wellman alleges that the School District 
and principal: (1) violated the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
794, and the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, by refusing to 
accommodate Wellman and treating him as if his injuries were 
fabricated or exaggerated; (2) violated the Rehabilitation Act 
and ADA by insisting that Wellman hold the marker on the 
football field, even though the School District was aware that 
he had a concussion and should not have been exposed to 
unnecessary physical risk; and (3) sought relief under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of Wellman’s equal protection 
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rights by failing to accommodate him, retaliating against him 
because he requested accommodations, and treating him 
differently from other disabled students.   
 
 The School District and principal filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  The District Court initially 
dismissed the claim against the principal in his official capacity 
but allowed all other claims to proceed.  After this Court 
decided Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media School District, 759 
F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 2014), which held that exhaustion under the 
IDEA was a jurisdictional requirement, the District Court 
concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and 
dismissed the Complaint without prejudice, because (1) each 
of Wellman’s claims were related to the provision of a FAPE, 
and he failed to exhaust his claims before a special education 
hearing officer; (2) the Settlement Agreement did not render 
the claims exhausted because it did not serve the key purpose 
of developing an underlying factual record; and (3) no 
exception to exhaustion was applicable to the case, given that 
no underlying factual record was developed, there were no 
allegations of an emergency situation requiring immediate 
resolution, and Wellman’s claims all principally related to his 
education.  Wellman appeals. 
 
II 
 
 We first address whether we have appellate jurisdiction 
over the challenged order.    The District Court’s order 
dismissed the complaint without prejudice for failing to 
exhaust administrative remedies.  Wellman contends that 
exhaustion would be futile, and so he has chosen not to present 
the claims in his complaint to an administrative hearing officer.  
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“[A]n appellant who does not attempt to avail himself of the 
administrative process, but who instead files an appeal raising 
the argument that exhaustion would be futile, ‘effectively 
stands on his original complaint’ and that in such cases we may 
exercise jurisdiction over an order dismissing a complaint 
without prejudice.”  Ghana v. Holland, 226 F.3d 175, 180–81 
(3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 68 n.2 
(3d Cir. 2000)). 
 
 Wellman has filed an appeal and argued that 
administrative exhaustion would be futile, and thus, he has 
effectively decided to stand on his complaint.  We will 
therefore treat the order dismissing the complaint without 
prejudice as a final order and exercise appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 
289, 293 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] plaintiff can appeal from a 
dismissal without prejudice when he declares his intention to 
stand on his complaint or when he cannot cure the defect in his 
complaint.”), aff’d, 532 U.S. 731 (2001).   
 
III 
 
 We next address whether we have subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Wellman invoked federal question jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by raising claims under several 
federal statutes.  The School District contends that the federal 
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint 
because Wellman’s claims seek relief under the IDEA and 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(l) requires such claims be presented to an 
administrative hearing officer, which Wellman failed to do.  In 
Batchelor, this Court held that exhaustion of the IDEA 
administrative process is normally required for a District Court 
to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.  759 F.3d at 272 (citing 
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Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 
778 (3d Cir. 1994)).  While we have some doubts as to whether 
IDEA exhaustion is a jurisdictional requirement,6 we are 
bound by this precedent.  Moreover, we need not wrestle with 
whether exhaustion is jurisdictional because the School 
                                              
 6 There appears to be some tension in our precedent as 
to whether a jurisdictional exhaustion requirement could be 
subject to a futility exception.  Compare Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 
475 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing the difference 
between “prudential exhaustion” and “jurisdictional 
exhaustion,” and explaining that a prudential exhaustion 
requirement can be bypassed under certain circumstances, 
including futility, but that a jurisdictional exhaustion 
requirement “is a prerequisite to a court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Regardless of whether there is a compelling 
reason a plaintiff failed to exhaust, a court is without subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claim”), and Nyhuis v. 
Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 69 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that a 
jurisdictional exhaustion requirement “by definition cannot be 
subject to a futility exception” (emphasis in original)), with 
D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 274-75 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (noting that exhaustion is a prerequisite to a district 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction, but stating that there are 
four exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, including 
futility, and explaining that “[a]bsent the existence of any of 
those exceptions, failure to exhaust will deprive a federal court 
of subject matter jurisdiction”).  Here, the exhaustion 
requirement can be excused, for example, if it is futile or if 
there are emergent circumstances that justify coming directly 
to federal court.  The fact that the exhaustion requirement has 
exceptions suggests that it is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
our authority to hear an IDEA case.     
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District insists exhaustion is required for Wellman to proceed.  
We must therefore address the School District’s contention that 
exhaustion is required, regardless of whether it is a prerequisite 
for us to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.  See, e.g., J.B. ex 
rel. Bailey v. Avilla R-XIII Sch. Dist., 721 F.3d 588, 593 n.2 
(8th Cir. 2013) (“Because the District has not waived the 
exhaustion argument and we conclude the Plaintiffs were 
required to exhaust their administrative remedies, we need not 
reach this issue.”); Muskrat v. Deer Creek Pub. Sch., 715 F.3d 
775, 783 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Ultimately, however, for purposes 
of this case[,] IDEA exhaustion’s status as a jurisdictional 
prerequisite is not at issue.  Had defendants failed to raise 
IDEA exhaustion below or failed to renew that question here, 
then our obligation to do so independently would turn on its 
jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional nature.” (citation omitted)).  
Thus, we will next examine whether Wellman’s claims are 
subject to § 1415(l)’s exhaustion requirement.   
 
IV 
 
 The IDEA requires participating states to provide 
disabled children with a FAPE, 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A), and 
sets forth an administrative mechanism for resolving disputes 
concerning whether a school has complied, id. § 1415.  The 
IDEA provides for an impartial due process hearing conducted 
by the state or local educational agency, id. § 1415(f), and the 
right to appeal the results to the state educational agency if the 
due process hearing was conducted by the local educational 
agency, id. §1415(g).  The IDEA also requires parties to use 
these procedures whenever they seek relief “available under 
this subchapter” even if they are pursuing relief under other 
federal laws.  Id. § 1415 (l).   Specifically, the IDEA provides 
that:   
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[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to 
restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and 
remedies available under the Constitution, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42 
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.], title V of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. § 791 et 
seq.], or other Federal laws protecting the rights 
of children with disabilities, except that before 
the filing of a civil action under such laws 
seeking relief that is also available under this 
subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) 
and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as 
would be required had the action been brought 
under this subchapter. 
 
Id. § 1415(l).  Thus, a plaintiff who seeks relief available under 
the IDEA must exhaust his administrative remedies before 
filing a lawsuit, even if he relies on laws other than the IDEA. 
 
 Courts of Appeals have disagreed about how this 
provision applied to non-IDEA claims, such as claims under 
the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and § 1983.  The Supreme Court 
weighed in on this issue in Fry v. Napoleon Community 
Schools.  In Fry, the plaintiffs alleged that their daughter’s 
school district discriminated against her in violation of the 
ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and state law when it barred her 
from bringing her service dog to school to assist her with 
mobility and balance problems.  137 S. Ct. at 750-52.  The 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that Fry was 
required to exhaust her IDEA remedies, even though she filed 
non-IDEA claims.  Id. at 752.  The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding that “exhaustion is not necessary when the gravamen 
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of the plaintiff’s suit is something other than the denial of the 
IDEA’s core guarantee—what the Act calls a ‘free appropriate 
public education.’”  Id. at 748 (quoting 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(1)(A)).  In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted 
that the IDEA requires exhaustion only where the plaintiff 
“‘seek[s] relief that is also available’ under the IDEA.”  Id. at 
752 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)).  “[T]o meet that statutory 
standard, a suit must seek relief for the denial of a FAPE, 
because that is the only ‘relief’ the IDEA makes ‘available.’”  
Id.  The Court explained that “in determining whether a suit 
indeed ‘seeks’ relief for such a denial, a court should look to 
the substance, or gravamen, of the plaintiff’s complaint.”  Id.7 
 
 In determining whether the gravamen of a plaintiff’s 
complaint is the denial of a FAPE, the Court directed courts to 
consider one “clue” in the form of two hypothetical questions: 
“First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same 
claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility 
that was not a school—say, a public theater or library?  And 
second, could an adult at the school—say, an employee or 
visitor—have pressed essentially the same grievance?”  Id. at 
756 (emphasis in original).  The Court explained that if the 
                                              
7 The Court declined to decide whether exhaustion 
would be required if a plaintiff complained of the denial of a 
FAPE but sought remedies which were not available under the 
IDEA (e.g., money damages).  Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 752 n.4.   
Under our precedent, however, a plaintiff’s request for 
remedies not available under the IDEA does not remove the 
claim from being subject to exhaustion.  Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 
276-78.  Thus, Wellman’s request for damages unavailable 
under the IDEA or in the administrative forum does not exempt 
his claims from the exhaustion requirement.   
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answer to both of these questions is yes, then it is unlikely that 
the complaint is about the denial of a FAPE.  Id.  By contrast, 
when the answer to both of these questions is no, then the 
complaint probably concerns a FAPE.  Id.   
 
 In addition to these two questions, the Court identified 
one additional consideration: 
 
A further sign that the gravamen of a suit is the 
denial of a FAPE can emerge from the history of 
the proceedings.  In particular, a court may 
consider that a plaintiff has previously invoked 
the IDEA’s formal procedures to handle the 
dispute . . . . A plaintiff’s initial choice to pursue 
that process may suggest that she is indeed 
seeking relief for the denial of a FAPE—with the 
shift to judicial proceedings prior to full 
exhaustion reflecting only strategic calculations 
about how to maximize the prospects of such a 
remedy.  Whether that is so depends on the facts 
. . . . [b]ut prior pursuit of the IDEA’s 
administrative remedies will often provide 
strong evidence that the substance of a plaintiff’s 
claim concerns the denial of a FAPE, even if the 
complaint never explicitly uses that term.   
 
Id. at 757.   
 
 Thus, under Fry, we must focus on the “gravamen of the 
plaintiff’s suit.”  Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 748; see also id. at 752 (“[A] 
court should look to the substance, or gravamen, of the 
plaintiff’s complaint.”); id. at 755 (“What matters is the crux—
or, in legal speak, the gravamen—of the plaintiff’s complaint . 
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. . .”).  Black’s Law Dictionary defines gravamen as “[t]he 
substantial point or essence of a claim, grievance, or 
complaint.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
Although the Supreme Court’s language spoke in terms of the 
“complaint,” which could mean that the Court was not 
endorsing a claim-by-claim approach, this is not how we 
understand the opinion.  The word “gravamen” bespeaks 
concern with both individual claims as well as the collection of 
claims called a complaint.  See id.  To apply the Fry test 
without consideration of the actual claims could result in 
situations where claims that are included in a complaint 
because they involve the same parties or course of events but 
do not involve the provision of a FAPE get swept up and forced 
into administrative proceedings with claims that are seeking 
redress for a school’s failure to provide a FAPE.  Although 
these administrative proceedings ensure that FAPE claims are 
first reviewed by agencies with the appropriate subject matter 
expertise, these agencies do not employ similar expertise when 
it comes to claims that do not involve the provision of a FAPE.  
For example, if a student who was challenging the sufficiency 
of her IEP also happened to be physically assaulted on the bus 
going to school, one could envision the plaintiff bringing a 
single complaint with different claims arising from her school 
experience, one of which seeks relief for physical injuries 
sustained while on the school bus and which has nothing to do 
with her access to a FAPE and IDEA relief.  Surely the Court 
would not have envisioned that such a claim would be subject 
to the IDEA’s procedural requirements, nor would subjecting 
such a claim to these procedural requirements necessarily 
result in any benefit to either the parties or court reviewing the 
matter at a later date.  Put differently, claims related to the 
implementation of an IEP involve the provision of a FAPE and 
are subject to exhaustion, see J.M. v. Francis Howell Sch. Dist., 
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850 F.3d 944, 951 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[Plaintiff] also claims the 
administrative process would not have addressed all her 
claims.  This, however, does not excuse exhaustion.  Although 
the administrative process may not address all claims, this 
court has held [that] exhaustion is not futile because it would 
allow the agency to develop the record for judicial review and 
apply its expertise to the plaintiff’s claims to the extent those 
claims are related to implementation of the IEP.” (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted)), but claims that go beyond 
the student’s educational experience are not, see J.S. III v. 
Houston Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 15-14306, 2017 WL 4351313, 
at *4-5 (11th Cir. Oct. 2, 2017) (isolation of a severely disabled 
and cognitively impaired student could give rise to a FAPE 
claim for failing to follow his IEP but isolating him for no 
educational purpose is a form of discrimination similar to the 
type that could be brought by an institutionalized adult and thus 
is cognizable as an ADA claim and not “merely a FAPE 
violation under the IDEA”).  In short, under Fry, a court must 
review both the entire complaint and each claim to determine 
if the plaintiff seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE.     
 
  Application of the Fry framework to Wellman’s entire 
complaint and each of his claims shows that his grievances all 
stem from the alleged failure to accommodate his condition 
and fulfill his educational needs.  A review of his detailed 
factual allegations shows that the conduct about which he 
complains would not have occurred outside the school setting 
and that a nonstudent could not (and would not) have “pressed 
essentially the same grievance.”  Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 756.  Most 
of the more than thirty paragraphs within the section of the 
complaint entitled “Statement of Facts” set forth Wellman’s 
requests for specific accommodations to help him achieve the 
level of learning expected from him, such as removing him 
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from his German and physical education classes, providing 
him with extra study halls, tutors, and additional time to 
complete assignments, and conveying to the teachers and 
football coach that he not engage in any unsuitable activity that 
might aggravate his symptoms and condition.  Wellman alleges 
that, rather than being provided with these accommodations, 
he was taken out of study hall so he could take exams, given 
too much work and denied extra time to complete it, had 
apathetic homebound instructors, and was not given support to 
address the impact of his concussive condition on his ability to 
learn.     
 
 These factual allegations are expressly incorporated by 
reference into each count of the complaint, and each count 
includes additional allegations.  In Count I, which seeks relief 
under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, Wellman reiterates the 
allegation that the school did not make accommodations for his 
educational and physical activities while at school and he 
specifically asserts that “[t]he failure to provide 
accommodations made [his] inability to survive in the school 
inevitable” and that he was “effectively excluded from school.”  
App. 138, 39.  In short, in this count, he complains about the 
educational experience that he had while in the School 
District.8  This is not the sort of claim that would be brought 
by a nonstudent against a non-school facility.  Thus, under Fry, 
                                              
8 At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel essentially 
acknowledged that Count I concerns the denial of a FAPE.  
Oral Arg. Recording at 2:00-3:30, Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. 
Dist., No. 15-3394 (3d Cir. Nov. 7, 2017), available at 
www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/15-3394 
WellmanJrv.ButlerAreaSchooletal.mp3. 
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this claim seeks relief under the IDEA and is subject to 
exhaustion. 
 
 Count II is also subject to exhaustion.  Count II seeks 
relief under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act due to the 
school’s alleged failure to ensure that Wellman was not 
exposed to danger after the initial head injury he sustained 
during physical education class but was still permitted to 
participate in school activities.  In this regard, the complaint 
alleges that Wellman’s mother asked that Wellman be given 
the accommodations of not being required to “suit[] up or [be] 
exposed to danger of playing conditions, but was still allowed 
to attend the [football] game.”  App. 140.  Thus, football was 
an extracurricular school activity that Wellman’s mother 
wanted him to experience safely.9  While there could be a 
scenario in which these events may not relate to a FAPE, as 
pleaded, it appears that the failure to ensure that Wellman was 
not placed in a dangerous situation at an extracurricular activity 
was offered as another example of how the school failed to 
accommodate him so that he could benefit from his educational 
experience.  App. 142 (alleging that “[a]s a consequence of the 
deliberate indifference of the School District to Wellman’s 
need for accommodations, Wellman was exposed to an 
extremely dangerous situation for a young man trying to 
recover from a concussion. . . . The [concussion he suffered 
while on the sidelines was] due to the deliberate indifference 
of the School District to Wellman’s need for 
accommodations”).  Because these factual allegations are 
                                              
9 His mother also complained about how the school 
treated students who suffered sports-related injuries and that 
the players were pressured to ignore their injuries and to 
participate.   
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intertwined with his complaints about the school’s failure to 
accommodate his educational needs, which include his 
participation in extracurricular activities, see S.H. v. State-
Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 264  (3d Cir. 
2003) (observing that an IEP “must detail those special 
education services [that] . . . allow the child to progress in both 
the general curriculum and participate in extracurricular 
activities . . .” (citing 20 U.S.C. 1414(d)(1)(A)(iii))), and 
because such allegations could not be brought by a nonstudent 
or outside the school setting, the claim set forth in Count II 
seeks relief for failing to provide a FAPE and is subject to 
exhaustion. 
 
 Count III, which alleges a claim under § 1983, also 
seeks relief for failing to provide a FAPE.  It incorporates all 
of the factual allegations within the complaint and further 
asserts that the School District’s special education department 
refused to provide Wellman services, and that the school 
treated him differently because his claim for such services was 
based upon the concussions he sustained during school 
activities, which the principal did not view as a disabling 
condition.  Again, his grievance is that he was unable to access 
educational services, which is something only a student at 
school can seek.  Thus, this is not a claim that could have been 
brought outside a school setting or by a nonstudent and, as a 
result, it is a claim that also seeks relief for failing to provide a 
FAPE and is subject to exhaustion. 
 
 In summary, both the entire pleading and each 
individual count show that Wellman seeks relief because the 
School District failed to provide him with academic 
accommodations that would have allowed him to succeed and 
remain enrolled in the school despite his injury.  These 
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allegations concern the denial of a FAPE, see Fry, 137 S. Ct. 
at 753-54 (explaining that the FAPE requirement entitles a 
child to “meaningful access to education based on her 
individual needs” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)), and foreclose the conclusion that Wellman could 
have brought the same complaint against another public 
facility or that an adult at the school could have brought the 
same complaint.     
 
 The history of the proceedings also show that the 
gravamen of Wellman’s suit seeks relief for the denial of a 
FAPE.  As the Fry Court noted, “prior pursuit of the IDEA’s 
administrative remedies will often provide strong evidence that 
the substance of a plaintiff’s claim concerns the denial of a 
FAPE, even if the complaint never explicitly uses that term.”  
137 S. Ct. at 757.  Here, Wellman’s parents filed a due process 
complaint against the School District requesting a hearing, an 
IEP, and compensatory education for two years based upon the 
same conduct alleged in the instant complaint.  Under Fry, 
Wellman’s pursuit of administrative remedies is further 
evidence that his complaint concerns the denial of a FAPE. 
 
 Therefore, considering Wellman’s complaint, including 
each count therein, and the history of the proceedings, we 
conclude that the gravamen of Wellman’s complaint is the 
denial of a FAPE and that the District Court correctly 
concluded that Wellman’s complaint is the type that would 
ordinarily require administrative exhaustion. 
 
 Here, however, Wellman’s parents signed a settlement 
agreement that explicitly released all claims that were or could 
have been pursued in the due process proceeding pursuant to 
the IDEA or any other federal or state statute.  Wellman 
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concedes that he released all claims within the jurisdiction of 
the administrative hearing officer.  All of his claims for relief 
were based upon the denial of a FAPE.10  As a result, since his 
complaint seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE, and he has 
conceded that he released all claims related to the denial of a 
FAPE, he has no claims to present to an administrative hearing 
officer and thus no claims to exhaust.  Wellman therefore has 
no basis upon which relief can be granted, and so his complaint 
must be dismissed with prejudice. 
                                              
 10 Even if we did not conclude that all of the claims in 
his complaint seek relief under the IDEA, the language of the 
release seems to convey a general release and would have 
released the claims that did not seek relief for failing to provide 
a FAPE.  The Settlement Agreement states that the Wellmans 
“release[d], relinquish[ed], and discharge[d] the Butler School 
District . . . from all causes of action, and damages of any 
nature, . . . which were pursued in the above-referenced case or 
which could have been pursued in the above reference case, 
pursuant to . . . any . . . Federal or State statute . . . .”  App. 101.  
While Wellman could try to argue that he could not have 
brought a claim for damages under the ADA, Rehabilitation 
Act, and § 1983 in the administrative case, it is unlikely he 
would succeed in making such an argument since all of the 
injuries he claims to have suffered, such as anxiety, severe 
emotional distress, embarrassment, and mental illness stem 
from educational deprivations that were or could have been the 
subject of the administrative proceedings and hence his ability 
to seek damages for those injuries has been released.  And, as 
stated previously, the fact that he could not recover the 
compensatory damages he now seeks in this lawsuit as part of 
the administrative proceedings does not convert his claims into 
non-IDEA claims.  See Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 276-78.   
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V 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order dismissing the complaint without prejudice and 
remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint with 
prejudice.    
